Introduction
Labour must never be made a commodity, lest "working poverty" will ultimately undermine the process of wealth creation that serves both as cause and consequence of political stability. This insight is at least more than 150 years old, but it took the international community an economic and political cataclysm to embed it in a global institution, and another one to embed it in the public policies deemed necessary to make economies more interdependent and to fuel the development of nations gaining or regaining sovereignty.
Today, the free interplay of supply and demand -colloquially termed "the market" -is almost universally accepted as the most efficient method for driving economic production worldwide. Labour being a production factor, efficiency is equally served by having it allocated according to market principles, i.e.
there where its productivity and return on investment are the highest, so that both profits and wages can be maximized. To the extent that labour markets "fail" to subsume costs to society, public authorities may intervene to allocate liabilities or -better still -spread potential costs over all those likely to incur them through social insurance. Since not all individual employers are likely to accept the cost to society -not to mention the worker and his or her family -of productivity loss and continued medical care resulting from a work-related accident, public authorities will legislate to impose employment injury benefit schemes.
The State may even foreclose markets to prevent low-productivity outcomes in the short term, and boost high -or at least sustained -productivity in the longer term. We may be able to find a 10-year old girl to glue our running shoes at half the wage we would have to pay her father, but if she is able to go to regularly attend school for 5 more years instead a full-time job, she may be able to earn 3 times her father's current labour market value -or at least acquire the relevant literacy to discern toxic from nontoxic glue.
This "case for labour standards" is widely accepted, if not always vigorously pursued, within the confines of national boundaries. Globalization, however, has made it possible to locate or, indeed, relocate production processes and public authorities are less inclined or less capable to allocate liability for the whole range of associated costs to society (labour, environmental etc.). Liberalization of international trade and investment creates at least a potential for stiffer competition between different regimes for regulating the labour market. Hence, one might expect States to protect their regulatory regimes whenever they undertake commitments to provide greater access to their markets for goods (or services)
produced under different regulatory regimes, thereby providing domestic and foreign investors a potential incentive to locate production in countries offering more relaxed rules.
Even if one only considers labour market regulation, the present line of reasoning raises two questions. Commission's report implies that the reasoning does not simply end there, but that the conclusion depends on a further consideration. The statement does not take issue with a country's comparative advantage of lower wages because of lower productivity. However, if a country suppresses collective bargaining or makes only lukewarm efforts to promote this market-based wage-setting method, and wages fail to keep pace with productivity improvements as a result, then the country is seeking its comparative advantage in a violation of a fundamental principle, so that its comparative advantage may be called into question.
Interestingly, the concept has now been formally enshrined in a new ILO Declaration, adopted in June
2008
. 16 The Declaration's vision is that the main development challenge in these times of globalization is for the world to create decent work for all. Creating decent work is not just about offering men and women hand-to-mouth livelihoods, but also the choice, leverage and platforms to "market" their work or shape economic decisions affecting their lives, and a degree of protection against loss of income. Much in the Declaration is about stressing the indivisibility of "decent work", and so the equal importance of all aspects "decent work"
17
, but the Declaration does go out of its way "noting:
-that freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining are particularly important to enable the attainment of the four strategic objectives; and -that the violation of fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage." (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf). 17 These aspects are commonly broken down into "four strategic objectives", i.e. promoting employment; developing and enhancing social protection measures; promoting social dialogue and tripartism; and respecting, promoting and realizing fundamental principles and rights at work. 18 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, I A (iv).
formally recognized for the most part, but not necessarily widely realized. Most, if not all of the national Constitutions of ASEAN member States, for example, formally recognize freedom of association as a fundamental human right, yet only 4 out of 10 have ratified C. 87, while 5 out of 10 have ratified C. 98.
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Whatever the future implications, the position appears consistent with a steadily growing body of literature that finds no significant correlation between lowering fundamental labour standards and the ability to attract foreign direct investment. In 2002, Kucera summarized the findings of prior studies of the effects on FDI of labour costs, unions, worker rights, and political and social stability as follows:
The evidence of the effects of labour costs on FDI is mixed, but tends to suggest that higher labour costs negatively affect FDI. … This is more clearly the case for the two studies that directly control for labour productivity. As to the effects of the presence of unions, the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. … Regarding worker rights, studies suggest that FDI tends to be greater in countries with stronger worker rights. … As with worker rights, studies addressing political and social stability suggest that greater stability positively affects FDI.
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Already in 2001, Kucera had pointed to the results of a survey among managers of transnational corporations, suggesting that political and social stability and quality of labour -both factors positively correlating with respect for workers' rights -ranked significantly higher among FDI location criteria than the cost of labour.
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In one of the first attempts to provide statistical evidence on the relationship between export performance and substandard social conditions, one of the authors used social development indicators relating to the freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, the situation of child labour and gender discrimination, respectively, but controlling and adjusting for the countries' implementation capacity. The correlation found for the period 1990-1995 was negative but not significant which seemed to indicate that, at most, countries might marginally improve their competitiveness by reverting to below capacity social policies 22 .
In 2007, the ILO and WTO secretariats jointly reviewed the available literature on the various correlations between trade and employment with a view to stimulating research in those areas for which there are gaps. The review found little academic support for the view that a high level of unionization and collective bargaining ("FACB rights") leads to an excessive rise in labour costs or to labour market rigidities. lower human capital accumulation, less productive labour relations fostered by social dialogue and less political stability. 24 One study found a positive correlation between FACB rights and export performance:
The paper finds robust relationships between stronger FACB rights and higher total manufacturing exports as well as between stronger democracy and higher total exports, total manufacturing exports and labour-intensive manufacturing exports. The paper finds no robust relationship between FACB rights and labour-intensive manufacturing exports. These results suggest that FACB rights do not harm the export potential of developing countries and may even stimulate it.
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Another study found, conversely, that "countries that are more open to trade have fewer rights violations than more closed ones". 26 The study also noted that the findings for these "process-related standards"
did not necessarily apply to "outcome-related standards" (e.g. wage levels). This more cautious finding as regards conditions of work is in turn echoed in a recent OECD conference paper concluding:
he evidence indicates that MNEs tend to promote higher pay in the countries in which they operate. The positive wage effect tends to be concentrated among workers that are directly employed by MNEs, but there also appears to be a small positive impact on wages in domestic firms participating in the supply chains established by MNEs. These effects are larger in developing than in developed countries, probably because the technology gap between foreign and domestic firms is larger in the former. The evidence about whether MNEs provide non-pay working conditions that are superior to those in domestic firms is more mixed. While working conditions in foreign firms tend to differ from those in comparable domestic firms, they do not necessarily improve following a foreign takeover."
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Commentators of the "social clause" often fail to make the important distinction between "process-related standards" and "outcome-related standards". One scholar, for example, opposes social clauses in bilateral trade agreements, partially because some of the standards that are invoked (freedom of association typically features amongst them) cannot legitimately lay claim to the universal support they are purported to have. He suggests that, while these standards are valuable, a longer-term strategy should be employed to pursue them, based "promoting rapid growth and spread of democracy". 28 What tends to be overlooked in this line of argument is that the ability of trade unions and employers' organizations to represent their members in labour market processes is not primarily an achievement per se, but a provider of democratic legitimacy to the public choices that are being made with respect to the direction and pace of economic growth itself. 
Social Clause -the plurilateral (regional), bilateral and unilateral dimension
In sum, it would probably be fair to state that multilateral attempts at creating a social floor for globalization have not reached beyond promotional efforts to strengthen national capacity to govern labour markets; declaratory resolve that development is not sustainable without decent work for all; and, more recently, warnings that international competitive advantage must not be sought in violations of fundamental international labour standards. New multilateral rounds for the liberalization of international trade -most recently the Doha round -have stalled, but this has not dented the leverage of the world's major export markets. As a result, bilateral trade agreements and unilateral trade preferences are featuring "social clauses" to exert pressure on labour market governance in developing countries.
United States
The United States has included labour rights provisions in its regional, bilateral and unilateral trade arrangements.
Regional Arrangements
The first category of trade arrangements that include labour provisions are regional trade agreements the U.S. maintains with its trading partners. In this section, we review the two that have been enacted as of 2008.
The North American Free Trade Agreement
In 44 The agreement requires that "The Royal Government of Cambodia shall support the implementation of a program to improve working conditions in the textile and apparel sector, including internationally recognized core labour standards, through the application of Cambodian labour law…. the Government of the United
States will make a determination…whether working conditions in the Cambodia textile and apparel sector substantially comply with such labour law and standards." 45 If the United States makes a positive determination that the Cambodia garment industry were in substantial compliance with Cambodian labour law and international labour standards, the U.S. could increase Cambodia's export quotas as rewards. 46 To satisfy the requirements of this agreement, a programme was set up and held by the ILO. 47 The ILO provides reports according to its monitoring and these reports are taken into account by the U.S. government and have lead to the increase of export quotas as long as these were in place.
The U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement is often said to be one of the most successful in outlining labour provisions in trade agreements. But there are also some drawbacks of it. For instance, the ILO takes a major role of monitoring labour conditions while the Cambodian Ministry of Labour's inspection capability has not been improved. standards with trade such as export quotas directly on paper but only required Viet Nam's efforts to improve working conditions in the textiles sector. The labour provisions are subject to the same dispute settlement arrangements as the commercial aspects of the agreement. 59 If a party is found to have violated the labour criteria, the other party may take "any appropriate and commensurate measure" to remedy the violation. 60 However, in 2006, an U.S.
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
NGO testified about human trafficking before Congress as follows:
There are an estimated 300,000 foreign guest workers employed in Jordan as domestics, in construction and agriculture, and in factories producing goods for duty-free export to the United Since then, Jordan has sought the assistance of the ILO to remedy the situation, and will now become one of the pilot countries in the "Better Work" programme, jointly sponsored by the ILO and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).62
FTAs covered by the TPA: Take U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement for example
The labour criteria for "fast track" treatment in the BTPAA include: (1) This article will take U.S.-Australia FTA for example to discuss its labour criteria and dispute settlement mechanism.
It is required in the U.S-Australia Free Trade Agreement that: Some see this as compensating the violator for its failure to effectively enforce its own laws. There are no explicit provisions to prevent a violator from simply shifting its budgeting, and thus no assurance that the assessment will actually provide additional money for enforcement. In addition, even if a government misspends the fine proceeds on measures that do nothing to remedy the violations of workers' rights, trade sanctions cannot be imposed. 
FTAs after the TPA
The labour provisions in FTAs, which the U.S. has concluded with Peru, Colombia, Panama and Korea, are different from the others covered by the TPA. This paper will take the Public of Korea as an example to explain the differences. referred to dispute settlement. 74 Only a government (i.e. not a trade union) can invoke dispute settlement against the other government for a labour violation under an FTA. 75 In the KORUS FTA, only one labour provision, i.e. the obligation for a government to enforce its own labour laws, is actually enforceable through dispute settlement. All of the other obligations in the labour chapter are explicitly not covered by the dispute settlement system and are thus unenforceable. 76 The labour enforcement procedures cap the maximum fine at $15 million and allow Korea to pay those fines to a joint commission to improve labour rights enforcement, and the fine ends up back in its own territory.
The provisions thus raise the same questions of effectiveness as for the U.S. -Australia FTA. 77 No rules prevent a government from simply transferring an equal amount of money out of its labour budget at the same time as it pays the fine. And there is no guarantee that the fine will actually be used to ensure effective labour law enforcement, since trade benefits can only be withdrawn if a fine is not paid. If the commission pays the fine back to the offending government, but the government uses the money on unrelated or ineffective programs so that enforcement problems continue un-addressed, no trade action can be taken. 
Unilateral Preference Programs
The U.S. unilateral preference programs are tools that the U.S. government uses to assist countries usually in the developing world, which is provided through an "enhanced" trading relationship with the United States. 79 Unilateral preference programs do not require reciprocity. Currently, the U.S.
Government maintains around five labour-fortified preferences which are discussed below. 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was founded in 1976 and offers duty-free treatment for more than 4,650 products from 144 designated countries and territories throughout the world. 81 The GSP had not originally contained a labour provision when it was enacted in 1976. 82 In the GSP Renewal Act of 1984, a list of five rights that were called "internationally recognized worker rights" was included. 83 It has been renewed periodically since then, most recently in 2006, when President George Bush signed legislation that reauthorized the GSP programme through 31 December 2008. 84 In designating a beneficiary country, the President must take into account whether such country has taken or is taking steps to give to workers internationally recognized worker rights:
a. freedom of association, b. freedom to organize and bargain collectively, c. prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour, d. a minimum age for the employment of children, e. protections for decent working conditions, including a minimum wage, maximum hours of work, and occupational safety and health standards.
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A GSP beneficiary must also implement any commitments it makes to eliminate the worst forms of child labour. 86 Urgent measures to eliminate the worst forms of child labour are a mandatory criterion, which each country must commit to before being designated a GSP beneficiary. 87 Internationally recognized workers' rights are discretionary criteria, i.e. that the President takes them into account in determining whether to designate a country as a beneficiary country for purposes of the GSP programme.
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The labour criteria in GSP can be invoked annually through a regulatory mechanism designed by the USTR. 89 An interested party may submit a request that the duty-free treatment accorded to eligible articles under the GSP be withdrawn, suspended or limited. 90 From 1984 to 2004, forty-eight countries were the subject of a petition for review. Thirty eight countries were subject to at least one complete review in that period, and thirteen countries had their privileges under the GSP suspended or revoked. These "social clauses" are mandatory conditions for eligibility under the CBERA.
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The CBTPA, however, modified the conditions to become discretionary criteria. (iii) The extent to which the country provides internationally recognized worker rights, including--- The CBTPA also added the elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a mandatory criterion. 107 The labour criteria in the 2000 CBTPA are the same as in the GSP and AGOA. Recently, the US Trade
Representative conducted an extensive review of 24 CBI countries. 108 In considering the eligibility of the 24 CBI countries and dependent territories that have expressed an interest in receiving the enhanced preferences of the CBTPA, the President is required to take into account the existing eligibility criteria of the CBERA, including the labour criteria listed above. 109 The reviews are provided partly for these purposes. This review also provided for the U.S. Government an opportunity to directly engage in improving concerning criteria in the beneficial countries. 110 Improvements occurred in various areas including the protection of internationally recognized worker rights. 
Andean Trade Preference Act
The Andean Trade Preference Act was enacted in 1991 to combat drug production and trafficking in The ATPDEA also requires the elimination of the worst forms of child labour. 114 The President must take the discretionary criteria, including internationally recognized workers' rights described in the statute as "factors affecting designation", into account when determining if a country should benefit from the trade privileges, but he may grant beneficiary status even if the country fails to meet the criteria. 115 Only as regards the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, countries must satisfy the criteria.
The ATPDEA authorizes the USTR to conduct reviews and provide an opportunity for the submission of petitions for the withdrawal or suspension of certain benefits of the programme. 116 The USTR recently reviewed the eligibility of countries and articles under the ATPDEA. 117 Based on the results of the reviews, the USTR has not recommended the withdrawal or suspension of ATPA/ATPDEA benefits based on violations of workers' rights. 118 However, petitions arguing for partial or total suspension of tariff benefits for failure to meet workers' rights criteria have been submitted to the USTR. While the USTR has so far not followed the argument, the following excerpt from the petition illustrates its typical character: 
…
Although Ecuador issued an executive decree on subcontractors in October 2004, as discussed below, the decree is so weak that it falls far short of meeting its goal of establishing a regulatory framework to prevent subcontractors from being used to violate workers' right to organize. … In addition, while Ecuador took the laudable step of selecting at least twenty-two child labor inspectors as required by law earlier this year, the number has since fallen to approximately fourteen, due to firings and resignations. Furthermore, as detailed below, the inspectors often are unable to effectively perform their duties and Ecuador continues to demonstrate a lack of commitment to the elimination of harmful child labor.
Ecuador has yet to issue implementing regulations, as required by law, for its new Code for Children and Adolescents, adopted over two-and-a-half years ago. It has also failed to amend the Labor Code to conform 113 
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Up until now, the USTR has never used Section 301 to investigate worker's rights violation with a view to imposing trade sanctions. 123 The AFL-CIO (the United States' biggest union federation) filed petitions claiming that systematic workers' rights violations in China gave Chinese goods an unfair trade advantage, but the USTR did not pursue the matter and did not impose punitive tariff duties. 124 The USTR argued that the United States had other and more effective mechanisms at its disposal to improve
Chinese workers' rights in China. 125 In the USTR's opinion, "a Section 301 investigation will neither shed more light on this problem nor lead to a more effective approach for addressing Chinese workers' rights and labour conditions."
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Other agreements liberalizing trade follow the cooperation model in encouraging respect for international labour standards. Some agreements include a chapter on social cooperation 137 while others refer to core labour standards established by the International Labour Organization explicitly. 
Unilateral Trade Arrangement -the GSP
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union has been in effect since July 1971, 139 granting duty-free access or a tariff reduction to products imported from beneficiary countries.
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The EU GSP is organized in 10-year cycles, and implemented through Council Regulations. 141 In 2004, the Commission set out the guidelines for the GSP scheme for the period 2006 -2015. 142 The additional reduction of duties for bringing domestic laws into conformity with certain fundamental ILO Conventions (the so-called GSP+) was introduced in 1998. 143 Use of forced labour or prison labour for producing export goods could give rise to the withdrawal of all preferences (not only the additional reduction).
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The European Union now publicly states that part of the primary objective of its GSP is to promote good governance, and that the additional "GSP+" preferences act as an incentive for vulnerable developing countries to ratify and effectively implement a set of key international conventions, including the ILO's fundamental Conventions. The eligibility criteria concerning international labour standards will likely prove to be demanding for 
Thai Labour Standards (TLS)
TLS is a private initiative in the sense that it is the market responding to "government failure" to enforce outcome-related labour standards in Thai workplaces to a level that foreign buyers will feel confident does not carry risks for their brand reputation. The labour standards mechanism, however, is not privately organizations. 166 The contents of this Labour Standard (TLS-8001) is not so different from other important international standards especially Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000). 167 It consists of 12 categories, namely general rules, management systems, forced labour, remuneration, working hours, discrimination in the workplace, discipline, child labour, female labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining, 156 Ibid, Article 17. 157 health and safety in the workplace and worker's welfare. 168 In 2004, a total of 304 Thai companies had been certified to the standard, of which 241 were large companies with 200 or more employees. 169 By
October 2008, 951 Thai companies had been certified, employing over 940,000 employees.
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The TLS incorporate requirements of Thai labour law, e.g.:
1. 5.1.2 The establishment shall provide for and keep a record as evidence demonstrating how the establishment has conformed to the requirements of this standard and for addressing the effectiveness of the management system. The record shall be clearly defined and easily accessible. The record required by law shall be provided in accordance with the form and procedure prescribed by the laws. Compared to Thai labour laws, some TLS-8000 standards may higher, e.g.:
1. 5.3.2 The establishment shall not require submission or deposit of identity card or any other personal identity paper from an employee either upon commencing employment or after, nor shall the establishment make it a requirement or a condition of employment to do so unless exempted by law. This is not specified by the Labour Protection Act 1998. trade union members is prohibited in the Labour Relation Law 1975, Chapter 9.
5. 5.7.3 The establishment shall set up measures to prevent the employees, especially women and young employees, from being sexually harassed by any means -verbal, gesture or physical contact. This is not regulated in the Labour Protection Law 1998. 6. 5.9.1 The establishment shall provide safe working conditions and environment for pregnant employee(s).
The protection of pregnant employees is not so comprehensively articulated in the Labour Protection Act 1998 (LPA). The LPA prohibits certain types of work to be performed by pregnant employees (S. 39), and permits a pregnant employee to request a change of duties (S. 42), but does not impose a specific obligation on the employer to provide a safe working environment.
7. 5.12 The establishment shall provide, for all employees, the convenience and adequate welfare and facilities as follows: Among them, 476 enterprises were certified at the completion level, and 465 enterprises were certified at the basic level. 177 The TLS-8001 requires companies to carry out inspections by themselves 178 which raises some doubts of its effect in reality.
There have been a number of problems in the implementation and adherence to Thai labour standards:
1. Comparing with a properly functioning public labour inspection system, TLS's self-monitoring system is less credible to buyers. standards) and nearly non-existent collective bargaining, leaving wage policy reliant on occasionally adjusted minimum wages.
5. Other problems in the government sector include a limited budget, limited experts, and limited ability to improve the standard due to rules and regulations. Also, the change of governments in
Thailand causes the improvement process to slow down or come to a halt. standards. 192 The improvement in labour standards had to be demonstrated by Cambodia first, and then the commercial reward followed by the US. 193 ILO, whose technical assistance was requested by both governments, prepared a project proposal, the result of which is Better Factories Cambodia. 194 In order to achieve the basic objective of the project -improving working conditions in Cambodia's textile and apparel sector, an independent monitoring system is run by the ILO and factories voluntarily registered. 195 The programme will be monitored by the ILO monitors 196 visiting to check working conditions without announcement in advance. 197 The key monitoring steps include: 198 3. There is substantial evidence that the programme has benefited garment workers in Cambodia.
For instance, employment in the garment industry more than quadrupled from 79,000 in 1998 before the agreement to over 350,000 in April 2008. 221 On the other hand, reports and surveys provide evidences of significant improvement in compliance with several labour standards. 222 Research in 1999, before the UCTA came into effect, disclosed that labour standards were "largely unchecked" and "[l]ack of enforcement, rather than inadequacy of existing legislation, pose[d] the greatest obstacle to guaranteeing basic rights to workers in the garment industry in Cambodia". 223 By contrast, after several years of UCTA quota incentives and ILO monitoring, a
World Bank survey of international buyers found that Cambodia's labour standards compliance ranked ahead of all its regional competitors. 224 Also according to the 8 th synthesis report of Better Factories Cambodia, on the whole, while a few factories made "little effort to improve", in most factories progress has been made in improving working conditions. 225 The growth of the garment sector and the democratic transition in Cambodia also has prompted the emergence of an active trade union movement in the country and at a time when Viet Nam was preparing for WTO membership. 240 The U.S. -Viet Nam bilateral agreement referred to earlier had already provided evidence that Viet Nam was more averse to formal "social clauses" than Cambodia. Stakeholders in the priority export sectors had to be "prepared" for the expectations that they were about to meet from buyers and consumers in export markets. The programme chose the apparel and footwear sectors in Viet Nam, given their importance to the national economy, their demonstrated susceptibility to market-based CSR pressures, and their urgent need to adapt to a quota-free world post 2005. 241 The broad objectives of this technical assistance included: 242 1. To build enough awareness about CSR among key government officials (representing government ministries and agencies concerned with social and economic policies) to engage in a discussion about government roles in strengthening CSR;
2. To explore and identify realistic and appropriate government roles for strengthening CSR in Viet Nam using labour standards and the footwear industry as a case study;
3. To support the government in stimulating a broad dialogue with key stakeholders in key export sectors about proposed government roles in strengthening CSR.
The study was carried out by the Vietnamese Institute for Labour, Sciences and Social Affairs (ILSSA, a "think tank" associated with the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social affairs or MOLISA), coordinated with the Advisory Group as stakeholder representatives, to ensure common understanding and enhanced ownership of the research process and outcomes. 243 The World Bank shouldered the costs of the programme and provided technical assistance with the research. 244 Key activities implemented under this Programme of Technical Assistance included:
Government in broadening public dialogue in this regard. to help the Government plan strategically for improved business competitiveness. 248 According to the research, most Vietnamese textile and footwear companies passively implemented their buyers' codes, rather than proactively seeking increased market share through CSR practices. 249 Suppliers commonly work with more than one buyer, and therefore implement more than one code, with the number ranging from 2 to 6 at any one time.
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The supporting research analyzed barriers to CSR awareness and implementation within a sample of enterprises (based on ownership, scale and location) and amongst key stakeholders. 251 The research revealed the following barriers and challenges:
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(resulting in a much higher annual cap).
Inconsistencies in national regulations create inefficiencies in code of conduct implementation,
relating to e.g. wage rate, benefits and employment conditions. 5. Unequal access to financial and technical resources is creating CSR disparities at enterprise level, especially for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
6. Shifting, anonymous, complex supply chains inhibit longer-term commitment to CSR.
7. The lack of transparency over current CSR practices is hindering potential market rewards.
Based on the research findings in Viet Nam, and comparable work in the other three countries in this programme, the World Bank made six recommendations to the Government of Viet Nam. 255 One of the recommendations calls for partially for synergies between public labour inspection services and private compliance monitoring agencies (particularly with a view to discerning violation patterns), partially for a division of labour, i.e. the public labour inspection services focusing on companies not reached by private codes of conduct: The Government of Viet Nam drew relatively different conclusions from its experience. It recognized that CSR and meeting expectations with respect to socially responsible production were now part and parcel of doing business on a global scale; that CSR could actually contribute to greater awareness of labour law and legal principles; and could even reduce the burden on labour inspection services. Considering the potential burden on financial and human resources, and the barriers to international trade that CSR could present, it concluded that the Government should not promote codes of conduct. 256 At any rate, since most codes of conduct referred to standards enshrined in Vietnamese labour law, efforts were better spent on promoting compliance with the law.
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In an evaluation of CSR public-private inspection arrangements overseen by public authorities, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) concluded that supporting these alternative initiatives is the way for Governments to go, for a number of simple reasons:
• Respond to stretched and limited public sector budgets in general, and enforcement activities in particular;
• Bring the expertise and capacity from the non-public sector that governments may lack in order to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability of conventional inspection approaches;
• Obtain greater marketplace credibility than provided by conventional public sector inspections, and
• Reduce systemic failures in sector-based inspections due to compliance costs for firms and corruption. 258 The evaluation readily admits that the arrangements "are also more complex to manage, they [are] dependent on a degree of cooperation among participants that may vary over time, and they raise accountability and legality issues." In addition, the alternative arrangements require public efforts to build the capacity of third party certifiers, and public oversight to ensure that the authority is not misused (e.g.
in the case of collusion). 259 Finally, the effectiveness and credibility of the arrangements depend on public transparency as regards the operation of the arrangement; accessibility of companies to the arrangement;
and accountability of the initiative. 260 All these concerns call for a legislative framework that does not necessarily undermine the voluntary character of the arrangement, 261 and, of course, "a well-respected and easily accessible judicial system".
262
It is easy to see the benefit that may be derived from private inspection initiatives complementing fledgling public efforts. However, the success of these private initiatives, in particular when brought to scale, appears to depend very much on the very factors that influence the effectiveness of public inspections, and even to add a layer of complexity. At the same time, other issues such as the political legitimacy of domestic labour standards and of their evenhanded enforcement, at least in principle, do not appear any closer to a resolution.
Conclusions

